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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the cornerstones of EU free movement of goods law remains the acceptance of a
system of mutual recognition: products manufactured legally in one’s home Member
State can be exported to and marketed in another – host –Member State.1 However, EU
mutual recognition has never been absolute.2 The host Member State may invoke public
interest reasons – such as the protection of public health – with a view to limit or even
prohibit those products on its territory.3 Although this principle of mutual recognition
* Professor of European Union law, Université de Liège and visiting professor, Université Paris-Dauphine. The
author can be contacted at pieter.vancleynenbreugel@uliege.be.
1 See Commission interpretative communication on facilitating the access of products to the markets of other
Member States: the practical application of mutual recognition [2003] OJ C265/2.
2 S Weatherill, “Why there is no ‘principle of mutual recognitio’” in EU law (and why that matters to consumer
lawyers)” in K Purnhagen and P Rott (eds), Varieties of European Economic Law and Regulation. Liber amicorum for
Hans Micklitz (Edward Elgar 2014) 402–403.
3 See already to that extent CJEU, Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein EU:
C:1979:42, para. 8.



















































































































seems clear in theory, practice shows that it remains unclear precisely when and how
mutual recognition procedures have to be set up under EU primary law and what role
they should play in the more general context of risk assessments also mandated by EU
law.4 The Court of Justice’s First Chamber Noria judgment of 27 April 2017 offers two
welcome clarifications on that matter, yet also leaves one crucial issue unaddressed in
this respect.
II. FACTS
The maximum amounts of vitamins that can be included in food supplements
have varied consistently among Member States. In an attempt to avoid that those
varying maximums would impede the free movement of food supplements,
Article 5 of Directive 2002/46 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States
relating to food supplements mandates the European Commission to set maximum
amounts of food supplements per daily portion of consumption as recommended
by the manufacturer.5 When doing so, the Commission is to take into account the
“upper safe levels of vitamins and minerals established by scientific risk assessment
based on generally accepted scientific data”, the “intake of vitamins and minerals
from other dietary sources” and the “reference intakes of vitamins and minerals for the
population”.6
Absent political agreement on the specific amounts to be set, however,
EU-wide maximums have not yet been established. As a result, Member States have
continued to set their own amounts not to be exceeded. In its Solgar judgment, the
Court of Justice of the European Union acknowledged that Member States still retained
the power to do so, as long as they respected the principles underlying the free movement
of goods.7
The Noria case arose against this background. Under French law, an interministerial
Order of 9 May 2006 relating to nutrients which may be used in the manufacture
of food supplements, determines the maximum daily doses for vitamins and minerals to
be included. Per Decree No 2006-352, those amounts cannot be exceeded by
products produced and marketed in France.8 Neither the Decree nor the Order provide
explicitly for a mutual recognition procedure that would permit food supplements
exceeding those vitamin thresholds to be marketed in France. Although such
procedures were in place for substances with a nutritional or physiological effect or
plants and preparations of plants,9 a similar procedure had not been foreseen in the
specific context of vitamins added to food supplements. The only way to receive
authorisation for products exceeding the maximum amounts set by French law is to
4 See A Szajkowska, Regulating Food Law. Risk Analysis and the Precautionary Principle as General Principles of
EU Food Law (Wageningen Academic Publishers 2012) 36–59.
5 See N Coutrelis and C Mathias, “Maximum Nutrient Amounts: How to Cope with the European Commission’s
Inaction. A national challenge in light of the ECJ rulings” [2011] EFFL 218.
6 Art 5(1) and (2) of Directive 2002/46 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 June 2002 on the
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to food supplements, [2002] OJ L183/51.
7 CJEU, Case C-446/08, Solgar Vitamin’s France and Others v Ministre de l'Économie, des Finances et de l’Emploi
and Others, EU:C:2010:233.
8 CJEU, Case C-672/15, Noria Distribution SARL, EU:C:2017:310, paras. 8 and 10 (hereafter Noria Distribution).



















































































































request a revision of the thresholds applicable in France, which would require generally
applicable regulations to be modified.10
Noria Distribution markets food supplements across the EU. Confronted with the
absence, in French law, of a mutual recognition procedure for vitamins, it could not ask
for an authorisation to market products which were produced lawfully in another
Member State, yet exceeded the daily doses maxima set by the 2006 Order in France.
Proceeding to market those products without authorisation in France and in violation of
the maximum amounts in place there, Noria was criminally prosecuted.11 In the course
of the criminal proceedings, Noria invoked the incompatibility of the absence of a
mutual recognition procedure with EU free movement law. The Tribunal de grande
instance of Perpignan was receptive to those arguments and raised three questions to the
Court of Justice.
Firstly, the French court asked whether Directive 2002/46 and the EU free movement
of goods principles allow for a national legal regime which does not offer a mutual
recognition procedure in the context of food supplements for vitamins and minerals
exceeding the French daily doses maxima limits, although lawfully produced or
marketed in another Member State.12
Secondly and related to this first question, the Perpignan court asked whether the
criteria applied under French law to set maximum daily doses could be permitted still as a
matter of EU free movement law. Under French law, maximum values have been
set as equal to three times the recommended daily allowances for nutrients presenting the
least risk. In practice, the envisaged calculation could result to setting the maximum
value at zero.13
Thirdly, the court asked whether the setting of maximum amounts could only be based
on national scientific opinions on the matter, even though recent international scientific
opinion seems to allow for higher doses to be consumed in identical conditions of use.14
III. JUDGMENT
In response to the first question, the Court of Justice reiterated its attachment to the free
movement of goods. Confirming its holding in Solgar that Member States remained
competent to set maximum daily doses in the absence of harmonised rules on the matter,
the Court additionally also re-established that those Member States are nevertheless
required to comply with Articles 34 and 36 TFEU in doing so.15 From the point of view
of Article 34 TFEU, any national measure setting limits on maximum daily doses of
vitamins constitutes a prima facie prohibited measure having an equivalent to a
quantitative restriction, “since a food supplement whose nutrient content exceeds the
maximum limits set by that legislation cannot be marketed in France, even if that food
10 Opinion of AG Bobek in Case C-672/15, Noria Distribution SARL, EU:C:2017:310, para. 14 (hereafter AG’s
Opinion).
11 Noria Distribution, para. 12.
12 Noria Distribution, para. 14.
13 Noria Distribution, para. 14.
14 Noria Distribution, para. 14.
15 Noria Distribution, para. 16.


















































































































supplement is lawfully manufactured or marketed in another Member State”16.
A measure restricting or prohibiting the marketing of foodstuffs produced in another
Member State can be justified on the basis of Article 36 TFEU if the Member State
concerned can demonstrate a genuine risk to public health.17 In addition, the rules in
place “must make provision for a procedure enabling economic operators to obtain the
authorisation to market food supplements including nutrients in doses exceeding those
authorised. The procedure must be one which is readily accessible and can be completed
within a reasonable time, and, if it leads to a refusal, the decision of refusal must be open
to challenge before the courts”.18 Given that such a procedure did not exist for food
supplements in French law19, the French legal framework was considered incompatible
with Article 36 TFEU.20
As far as the second question was concerned, the Court repeated its previous case law
that when setting maximum daily doses, Member States were to be guided by the criteria
laid down in Article 5(1) and (2) of Directive 2002/4621, taking into account the upper
safe levels of vitamins and minerals established by scientific risk assessment based on
generally accepted and relevant scientific data and not on purely hypothetical
considerations.22 According to the Court, setting upper safe limits in the absence of a
proven risk to human health and without such a scientific assessment does not satisfy
those criteria.23 AlthoughMember States can determine the maximum amounts at a level
below those upper safe limits and even at zero, they would have to assess, on a
case-by-case basis, whether maximum amounts should be set below that level.24
Nutritional needs of the population may play a role in that regard, but the absence of such
needs cannot as such justify a total prohibition on the marketing of food supplements.25
Therefore, a method which consists in setting those amounts without taking into account
all of those elements, on the sole basis of the nutritional needs of the population
concerned, or without that setting being carried out on a case-by-case basis, is not
compatible with Article 5 of Directive 2002/46 or with the provisions of the TFEU
relating to the free movement of goods.26 The Court leaves it to the national court to
make that assessment in the specific case at hand.27
On the third question, the Court interpreted the notion of generally accepted scientific
data in Article 5 of Directive 2002/46. It held that in the absence of reliable international
scientific data, such an assessment can be carried out merely on the basis of more reliable
national scientific opinions.28 That modus operandi cannot, by contrast, be relied on
16 Noria Distribution, para. 19.
17 Noria Distribution, paras. 21 and 23.
18 Noria Distribution, para. 22.
19 Noria Distribution, para. 25.
20 Noria Distribution, paras. 26 and 27.
21 Noria Distribution, paras. 16 (also reiterating that point already in the first question), 31 and 39.
22 Noria Distribution, para. 33.
23 Noria Distribution, para. 34.
24 Noria Distribution, paras. 35 and 37.
25 Noria Distribution, para. 38.
26 Noria Distribution, para. 40.
27 Noria Distribution, para. 41.



















































































































where such international data are also available.29 Setting upper limits on the basis of
national scientific opinions only, even though recent international scientific opinions
concluding in favour of the possibility of setting higher limits are also available, is a
practice precluded by Directive 2002/46 and the TFEU provisions relating to the free
movement of goods.30
IV. COMMENT
The Noria judgment offers Member States clear guidance on two points. On the one
hand, when conducting risk assessments on the basis of relevant scientific data,
Member States also have to include relevant studies that do not necessarily focus on their
own territories or population (1). On the other hand, Member States also have to have in
place tailored mutual recognition procedures (2). Simultaneously, however,
the judgment remains ambivalent on how the envisaged mutual recognition procedures
are to interact with food supplement risk assessment frameworks set up at Member
State level (3).
1. Relevant scientific data do not necessarily concern the specific
Member State’s territory
Noria explicitly confirms that relevant scientific data sufficiently establishing the public
health risk on the basis of the latest scientific research have to inform Member States’
risk assessments accompanying the setting of maximum vitamin amounts.31 The Court
confirms its previous case law,32 adding to it that relevant international scientific data
also have to be taken into consideration in that regard.33
It is nevertheless important to nuance the reliance on international studies in this
judgment. The Court did not say that international scientific data have always to be used
in studies regarding the maximum amounts of vitamins in food supplements. However,
when such studies are available and when their results are relevant for decisions to be
taken in the context of an EU Member State, that Member State needs to take those
studies into account as well. At the same time, however, when no international scientific
data are available or when those data are not or no longer relevant, the judgment can be
understood as still allowing Member States to continue to rely only on national data for
the purposes of assessing risks in the specific food supplement context. If both relevant
national and international data are available, Member States will seemingly have to
include both in their risk assessment.
The Court in that regard above all clarifies that the relevance of scientific studies is not
to be determined on the basis of territory- or population-linked criteria only. The mere
fact that the underlying data of a scientific study do not concern the territory or
29 Noria Distribution, para. 47.
30 Noria Distribution, para. 50.
31 Noria Distribution, para. 49.
32 CJEU, Case C-95/01, Greenham and Abel, EU:C:2004:71, para. 47; CJEU, Case C-192/01, Commission v
Denmark, EU:C:2003:492, para. 48; CJEU, Case C-24/00, Commission v France, C-24/00, EU:C:2004:70, para. 55;
Case C-41/02, Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:2004:762, para. 49; CJEU, Case C-333/08, Commission v France,
EU:C:2010:44, para. 89.
33 Noria Distribution, paras. 50–51.


















































































































population of the Member State can no longer suffice to exclude them as irrelevant from
a Member State risk assessment point of view. The Court’s judgment could thus be
understood as requiring national authorities even more actively than before to look for
other relevant studies not conducted on their territories or focusing on their population in
order to be able to take them into consideration in their risk assessment. It will fall upon
national authorities to justify the studies they have chosen and to explain to those
concerned why those studies are indeed relevant.
2. An obligation to set up mutual recognition procedures
In addition to clarifying the notion of relevant scientific data, the Court also clearly
obliges Member States to have in place “a procedure for the placing on the market of that
Member State of food supplements whose content in nutrients exceeds the maximum
daily doses set by that legislation and which are lawfully manufactured or marketed in
another Member State”.34 Building on earlier case law stressing the importance of such a
procedure,35 the Court now makes unequivocally clear that it always has to be provided
as a matter directly of Article 36 TFEU.
In line with previous case law, the Court does not impose overly-specific criteria on
Member States on how to organise those mutual recognition procedures. It only repeats
that procedures in place have to be readily accessible and reasonably timed in order to
ensure that products manufactured lawfully in another Member State can be marketed as
fast as possible in another Member State.36 Other procedural conditions are left to the
Member States’ discretion, as long as they effectively allow for mutual recognition
requests to be made by producers or importers of a food supplement legally
manufactured in another Member State.
3. Mutual recognition procedures and risk assessment frameworks:
(where) do they interact?
The fact that a mutual recognition procedure has to be in place, does not imply that the
Member State concerned is to automatically authorise the marketing of that product on
its territory. To the extent that the producer or importer asks for authorisation to market
his food supplement lawfully produced in another Member State, the host Member State
may always refuse on the basis of public health risks that have been identified when
conducting its risk assessment preceding the setting of maximum amounts. Under EU
secondary legislation enabling mutual recognition procedures, a reference to a
previously carried out risk assessment would be sufficient in order to justify a decision
refusing a marketing authorisation when no new evidence has been brought forward.37 It
would seem that the Court had this framework in mind when interpreting Article 36
TFEU as requiring a similar mutual recognition procedure to be in place.
34 Noria Distribution, para. 28.
35 CJEU, Case C-24/00,Commission v France, EU:C:2004:70, para 26; CJEU, Case C-95/01,Greenham and Abel,
EU:C:2004:71, para. 35; CJEU, Case C-333/08, Commission v France, EU:C:2010:44, para. 81.
36 Noria Distribution, para. 22.
37 See Art 6 of Regulation 764/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 laying down
procedures relating to the application of certain national technical rules to products lawfully marketed in another



















































































































It therefore follows from the judgment that, under Article 36 TFEU, Member States
can still refuse an authorisation by referring to a previous risk assessment when a request
for authorisation of a legally produced product in another Member State is not
accompanied by new data or facts showing that the maximum amounts set previously at
Member State level no longer correspond to the latest scientific findings. In that
understanding, the mutual recognition procedure envisaged would then serve as a tool to
inform the producer or importer concerned about the risk assessment made at Member
State level and the resulting maximum amount decisions based on public health
considerations.
The Court’s judgment is less clear on the extent to which a subsequent mutual
recognition request and the accompanying procedure should be conceived as
instruments also to challenge previously-made risk assessments. In the hypothesis
where the importer or producer of a food supplement lawfully manufactured in another
Member State offers new facts or new data, showing that the maximum amounts set at
Member State level no longer correspond to the latest scientific findings, the mutual
recognition procedure may constitute an instrument to challenge the findings of a
previously conducted risk assessment. A Member State could then use the requests for
mutual recognition to review its risk assessment and, as a result, modify its upper limits
when determining maximum vitamin amounts.
Advocate General Bobek seemed favourable to that interpretation. According to his
Opinion, the purpose of EU-imposed mutual recognition procedures should lie in
allowing new circumstances or new scientific data leading to another conclusion than the
ones having informed the earlier adoption of maximum daily doses to be voiced.38 Those
new facts, and the challenge they offer to the rules in force in a specific Member State,
and not the actual request mutually to recognise a product manufactured legally in
another Member State, would, in the Advocate General’s Opinion, have to constitute the
key objective of any procedure allowing a business to ask for authorisation of a legally
manufactured product from another Member State.39 According to the Advocate
General, the principle of mutual recognition in EU internal market law would therefore
specifically and only require Member States to ensure that importers may seek revision
of that prior risk assessment on the basis of scientific evidence not previously taken into
account by the Member State.40
The Court did not follow the Advocate General on this point, obliging the Member
States only to provide for mutual recognition procedures and for a judicial review
procedure against decisions refusing to authorise products. In so holding, it left the
Member States in control to decide whether a mutual recognition procedure is to become
of itself an instrument to challenge previously executed and implemented risk
assessments. On the one hand, Member States could allow for a fresh risk assessment
to be carried out within the mutual recognition procedure context, in accordance with the
arrangements set under national law. On the other hand, Member States could demand or
request a new risk assessment to be carried out, not within the framework of the mutual
38 AG’s Opinion, paras. 50 and 51.
39 AG’s Opinion, para. 55.
40 AG’s Opinion, para. 61.


















































































































recognition procedure, but every time the relevance of scientific data would be contested
in the context of a mutual recognition request. In Noria, the Court does not want to
impose either modus operandi on Member States, leaving it to each Member State to
decide whether to take such action. From that point of view, Member States could also
decide not to provide for any interaction between mutual recognition and risk assessment
procedures, all without violating EU law.
Although Noria would have been the perfect opportunity to shed some light on the
interaction between both procedures as a matter of EU law, the Court clearly chose not to
do so. Whilst understandable from a national procedural autonomy point of view, it is
submitted that the Court’s current reasoning in this respect above all opens the door to
the emergence of a variety of mutual recognition procedures with different consequences
in terms of risk assessments across the EU Member States. Given that the rest of the
judgment clearly is in favour of a more streamlined science-based approach to food
supplement risk assessments, the Court’s lack of a more explicit dictum on how to
integrate mutual recognition procedures within that approach is remarkable to say
the least.
V. CONCLUSION
The Noria judgment confirms the Court’s previously established case law on Member
States’maximum daily vitamin dosage regulations. In the absence of EU harmonisation,
Member States remain at liberty to prohibit the marketing of certain food supplements,
so long as their decision is based on relevant, reliable and – if available – international
scientific data and as long as some kind of mutual recognition procedure is available.
Noria does not, however, fully clarify how mutual recognition procedures are to differ
from or relate to risk assessment procedures and frameworks in place as a matter of EU
law. As a result, diversified national risk assessment and mutual recognition procedures
are likely to remain in place for now.
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